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ENDANGERED MAN
AND THE REPLY OF THE CHRISTIAN
FROM THE JURIDICAL VIEWPOINT*
A. Introduction
The central theme of this series of lectures implies that man — and then 
especially modern man, who provokes our concern — is an endangered being 
and that the Christian has a reply to this threat.
I have been accorded the signal honour of being asked to evaluate the 
problem from the point o f view of the Law. 1 would like to  extend my 
cordial appreciation to  the PU for CHE for this invitation.
There can be no doubt as far as the first implication goes, which is that 
man is an endangered being.
The second im plication, which claims that the Christian always has an 
answer, is more problem atic, especially if one looks at the central theme 
from the point of view of Law.
Should one approach the question from a juridical viewpoint it would 
seem that there are three questions in particular deserving of attention , viz.
(a) Can the Law constitute a threat to  man?
(b) Can the legal order become the subject m atter of a threat leading to a 
threat to man as encompassed within  the legal ordrr?
(c) Can the Law assume the function of protector of man against the treat? 
A ttention should thus be directed at the possibility of:
(i) the law as the threatening force;
(ii) the law as the threatened entity; and
(lii) the law as a p ro tector o f man in the face of the threat.
In each instance an effort has to  be made to  determine the Christian 
point of view with regard to  the m atter under consideration.
* Translation from the original Afrikaans lecture. 
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B. The law as the threatening force
The question to be evaluated here is whether it is possible to abuse the 
law to such an extent that it constitutes a threat to mankind, l-.xprcsscd dif­
ferently: can the law be used as a means of com mitting an injustice?
There can be no doubt that state authorities sometimes com mit injustices 
in the name of the law. Some biblical scribes apparently already struggled 
with this evil, as emerges from the following:
Proverbs 16:12: It is an abom ination of kings to  com mit wickedness... 
Deuteronomy 16:19: Thou shalt not wrest judgem ent...
Psalm 94:20: Shall the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee, which 
frameth mischief by a law?
Proverbs 18:5: It is not good to  accept the person of the wicked, to over­
throw the righteous in judgm ent.
Isaiah 5:22-23: Woe unto them... which justify the wicked for reward, and 
take away the righteousness of the righteous from him!
In ordinary parlance one speaks in such cases of “ tyranny” , “force” , or 
“suppression” .
A state authority  (including the judiciary which is part of the state 
authority) which is guilty of such action abuses its own function and thus 
its own nature. What then would constitute the function of the state au tho­
rity from the scriptural point o f view?
It rests on
(a) maintaining the state and society (cf .Proverbs 29:4: “The king by judg­
m ent establisheth the land...”);
(b) protecting and cherishing the country (cf. Psalm 78:7: “ He chose Dawid 
also his servant, and took him from the sheepfolds... to feed Jacob his peo­
ple, and Israel his inheritance” );
(c) com bating evil in society (cf. Romans 13:4: “ For he is the minister of 
God to  thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he 
beareth not the sword in vain...”);
(d) reconciling the interests of subject and ruler in such a way that justice 
may prevail (cf. Psalm 82:3): “Defend the poor and fatherless: do justice to 
the afflicted and needy” ; Deut. 16:20: “That which is altogether just shalt 
thou follow ”).
As stated already, a state authority  which com mits tyranny abuses its 
own function and intrinsic nature. From a legal philosophical point o f view 
the question arises as to  whether man is still dealing with true law when the 
legal norm itself becomes the instrum ent of injustice. This can be answered 
in more than one way depending on the school of thought to  which one be­
187
longs (which schools cannot be considered within the scope of this paper). 
Whether man in such a situation is dealing with defective law or sanctioned 
injustice is not the point — m an’s existence is threatened by these measures 
o f authority . The fact also remains that these prescriptions of authority 
function in the name of the law and even should this be not true law, it still 
brings the law into disrepute.
Examples from the Scriptures are the following:
(i) Pharaoh’s com mand to  kill the Hebrew boys (Exodus 1:16);
(ii) Darius’ com m and that only the king may be petitioned in prayer for 
th irty  days (Daniel 6:7-11);
(iii) H erod’s infanticide (Matthew 2:16).
Well-known examples from the tw entieth century are
(i) the Nazi prescriptions according to  which many people were executed 
because of their belonging to a particular race; and
(ii) the laws of President Amin of Uganda which robbed many Indians of 
their possessions and which led to their deportation.
The above are extreme examples and nobody except wilful enemies 
could suggest that such government prescriptions exist in South Africa, yet 
every Christian who wishes to adhere to the Scriptural prescription of seek­
ing out justice should continually reflect critically on whether all govern­
m ent prescriptions answer to the demands of justice. Those laws specifically 
which condone extended detention w ithout trial present problems to  the 
Christian conscience.
C. The law as the threatened entity
The times in which we live have indicated that the legal order itself is 
threatened at times.
Some examples:
(a) Some years ago a group of Palestinian terrorists launched a murderous 
attack on Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics. They were arrested but 
not punished. Why not?
(b) The internal wing of Swapo conspires with the external wing to commit 
murder. Many murders are in fact com m itted. Why aren’t the leaders prose­
cuted in the criminal courts on the basis o f com mon purpose? Would the 
reason be that a conspiracy cannot be proved or that the authorities shy 
away from the international storm that this would create?
(c) Russia invades Hungary. Cambodia succumbs to the Vietnamese 
onslaught. The Security Council of the U.N. which is supposed to m onitor 
the rights of nations allows this openly.
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In all these instances one common element is to  be found: the principles 
of sound adm inistration of justice are being eroded by the political on­
slaughts of the tw entieth century. And ordinary man is threatened because 
of this — no t merely threatened, often destroyed.
What would be the answer of the Christian to  this threat? The powers in­
volved here are so ferocious that the Christian’s only recourse is to  the hum­
blest o f prayers: “Deliver us from evil...” .
D. The law as a protective force against this threat
It is the natural function of the law, as far as it may be able to  do so, to 
pro tect man against these threats. This appears clearly from the following 
obvious examples:
* man is threatened by his grasping nature: for tha t reason the law makes 
provision against crimes such as theft, robbery, blackmail, fraud and 
gambling;
* man is threatened by his violent nature — therefore m urder and assault are 
punishable offences;
* man is threatened by his carnal urges — thus rape, incest and certain other 
forms of imm orality are branded as criminal.
At first glance the fact tha t the law accords one protection in the above 
instances does not create problems for the Christian. The legal rules 
prohibiting the commission of the above crimes are in accord with the 
Scriptural demand that the government should bear the sword “ to execute 
wrath upon him tha t doeth evil” (Romans 13:4). But as soon as one reflects 
upon the fact that m urder, rape and armed robbery can be visited by the 
death penalty the m atter assumes a problem atic nature. Would all Christians 
agree tha t there is a Christian foundation underlying the legal rules allowing 
the death penalty for armed robbery? What should a Christian legislature be 
in response to  the rapist and the armed robber? Should he accede that the 
crim inal’s life may be taken in the case where the crime was com m itted in 
aggravating circumstances? May the legislature unlimitedly extend the num ­
ber of cases entailing the death penalty, going to  the extrem e of, for exam­
ple, employing the death penalty as a means to  conserve petrol? Where 
should the line be drawn?
In the abovementioned examples the Christian should experience no dif­
ficulty in assessing the need for com bating the relevant threat by the en­
actm ent and application of legal measures. The problem is rather whether 
the way in which the law seeks to  guard against the threat is founded on 
Christian principles.
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'['he case just mentioned, however, is not the onl i one in which the 
Christian may entertain a doubt as to  how far he may legally go to  avert the 
threat. 1 intend therefore to  focus on two problem areas by way of example. 
The first problem area to be focussed on deals with abortion*).
It is a well-known fact that there are a disquietingly high num ber of 
backstreet abortions in South Africa every year as a result of undesired preg­
nancies. A comprehensive sociological survey would be needed to  establish 
the reasons underlying this situation. Although I do not pretend to  be a so­
ciologist, I would guess that the following factors play a role:
* so-called liberal attitudes towards extra-marital sexual relations;
* inability or unwillingness to assume the responsibility for parenthood;
* the belief (a corollary of the existentialist world view) that man has the 
inalienable right to  determine his own destiny, which contributes to  the idea 
that the pregnant woman would have the inalienable right to  decide for her­
self whether or not to  term inate her pregnancy.
Whatever the underlying causes may be, however, one has to face the fact 
that the situation exists. Should one accept that the unborn foetus is “a hu­
man being in his pre-natal existence” , then one is, undoubtedly, dealing in 
this case with a very serious threat against man — in his pre-natal existence. 
How should this threat be averted?
The ideal solution would be to  avoid undesired pregnancies. This, how ­
ever, is an ideal that cannot be realized, and therefore the legal order has to 
find an alternative solution. Generally speaking the threat is com batted 
legally by proclaiming abortion to be a crime. But, as will be seen, the 
legislature has allowed certain exceptions.
In the light of this situation certain points affecting principle arise:
(a) Should the principle allowing exceptions be subscribed to  at all? In other 
words: is it possible to  visualise circumstances in which the deliberate killing 
of an unborn foetus may be allowed on principle?
(b) Should the principle o f allowing exceptions be granted the right of exist­
ence: what exceptions should be allowed?
1) For an extended debate on abortion, read The Great Debate: Abortion in the South 
African Context, edited by G.C. Oosthuizen, G. Abbott and M. Notelovitz, Howard 
Timmins, Cape Town. Cf. further: T.A. Barnard, LAI. du Plessis, G. Kempff and G. 
Oosthuizen, “Aborsie, ’n juridiese, etiese en regsetiese vraagstuk”, Koers, 3(1978), 
pp. 330 ff; as well as F J .  van Zyl, „Regsvorming en regstoepassing as voortvloeisel uit 
die Christelike lewens- en wéreldbeskouing” Woord en Wetenskap (edited by D.F.M. 
Strauss, H J .  Stone, J.C. Lombard and J.M. Gerber), pp. 215 ff.
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* Should one accede to  pleas from those wishing to  com bat backstreet 
abortions by increasing the num ber of legalized abortions? (It is well-known 
that the viewpoint is sometimes advocated tha t abortion-on-demand should 
be allowed.)
* Is the present legal situation with regard to  abortion not already in 
conflict with Christian principles?
In order to see all this in true perspective we should look briefly at the 
present state of affairs regarding abortion legislation:
In accordance with the Abortion and Sterilization Act. 1975, a legal 
abortion may be perform ed in the following circumstances: where a con­
tinued pregnancy will endanger the life of the woman; where a continued 
pregnancy constitutes a serious threat to the w om an’s physical or mental 
health or where there is a serious risk that the child may suffer from a 
serious physical or mental defect of such a nature that he will be irreparably 
handicapped; where the pregnancy is the result of rape, incest or unlawful 
carnal intercourse with a female idiot or imbecile in contravention of 
section 15 of the Immorality Act, 1957. (In passing it might be m entioned 
that the statute embodies several provisions which have to  be complied with 
before an abortion may be perform ed, but these are left out of considera­
tion here as they are not crucial to  the m atter.)^)
Before this statu te was promulgated abortion was perm itted only in cases 
where a continued pregnancy endangered the w om an’s life-*). The statute 
under consideration has thus considerably extended  the scope of legalized 
abortion.
The question now facing the Christian is whether or not this extension 
represents a step in the right direction. Has the legislature in conflict with 
Christian principles intensified  the onslaught on man in his pre-natal exist­
ence or has it done that which can be justified on Christian principles? 
These questions cannot be dealt with adequately unless one ascertains what
2) For a discussion of the statute under consideration, cf. J.C. Stassen, “Die Wet op 
vruRafdrywinR en stcrilisasic, 2 van 1975”, Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrihaanse Reg, 1976, 
pp. 260 ff.
3) For a discussion of the law as it was before the promulgation of the statute in quest­
ion, cf. S.A. Strauss, “Abortion and the I.aw in South Africa, The Great Debate, pp. 
1 25 If.
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an unborn embryo essentially is. Should it be regarded as a potential human 
being who should then be treated  as such in the juridical, ethical and reli­
gious spheres? Or should it be regarded as something essentially and radical­
ly different from man, with the result that it may be treated in a radically 
different way? Is the deliberate killing of an em bryo (except in a case where 
a w om an’s life or condition of health is seriously endangered) m urder or 
principle?  Should Genesis 9:6 be applicable to an em bryo? (“Whoso shed- 
deth m an’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God 
made he m an.”)
Should the em bryo therefore already be regarded as being in the image of 
God?
This question may be further elucidated as follows: no reasonable human 
being would even consider condoning the m urder of a child concerned in 
rape or incest. The existing law, however, allows the abortion of an em bryo 
thus begotten, with the proviso that the w om an’s life or physical or mental 
health be in danger. Similarly no Christian would advocate the killing of a 
child who is seriously and incurably physically or mentally retarded — yet 
the em bryo may be aborted should there may be a serious danger o f such 
defectiveness.
The underlying premise would seem to be that the em bryo is something 
fundam entally different from a human being, so that the legislature is free 
to  determ ine for itself the circumstances in which an em bryo may be ab o rt­
ed.
The question remains, however, w hether this viewpoint is defensible on 
principle.
For interest’s sake one might m ention here Prof. J.A . H eyns’ viewpoint 
as expressed in his book Die Nuwe Mens onderweg^). lie says (in translated 
form) that “ Whoever destroys developing life, according to Barth, kills a 
human being. As soon as conception has taken place, we are dealing with a 
hum an life however incom plete and undeveloped il might be -  a human 
being created by God in His own image. To my mind there can be only two 
exceptions: where life confronts life and either m other or baby (or both) 
would seem to be in m ortal danger, a choice will have to be made. But it 
would not seem to be morally and religiously justifiable to prejudge the
4) I aftllx-r»; Publishers, Cape Town, 1 970, pp. I X I -1 R2. 
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issue and decichs in all cases to  save the life o f either the m other or child. 
The choice has to  be left open-ended as circumstances might determine 
which of the two should be saved. The second exception concerns rape. 
Here it does not concern an unexpected child, or an unwanted child, but 
one that has been forced on to  one, the legacy of a feared and abhorred in­
truder. Such an event would be enough to  scar the m other em otionally and 
physically for the rest of her life”®).
In a case of rape, where there is a real danger of “perm anent physical or 
em otional scarring” one might agree that abortion might be allowed on the 
basis o f a crisis situation. But this is not necessarily the case. Would it, on 
principle, also be permissible to  destroy the foetus in cases where the 
woman might no t be physically or em otionally seriously affected by the 
continuing pregnancy? Should we accept that “as soon as conception has 
taken place... we are dealing with a human being... created by and in the 
image of G od” , then it seems unclear to me tha t it would be permissible to  
kill purely because it was “ forced” on a woman.
Apart from these reservations regarding Prof. Heyns’ views it is to  be 
pointed out that the statute under consideration sanctions abortions not 
covered by him, such as in the case where it can reasonably be expected 
that the child will be seriously retarded®), or where the pregnancy was the 
result o f inrest. The question now arises as to  whether there are un-Christian 
elements in a statute passed by Christian Members of Parliament.
Suppose for the m om ent that an unborn em bryo/foetus is something 
radically different from  a human being while it is still not viable — in other 
words, that a t this stage it is merely an appendage of the m other’s body. Yet 
the statute in question makes no distinction between a viable and a non- 
viable foetus — an unborn foetus of eight m onths conceived after rape or in­
cest may legally be aborted should the m other decide not to continue the
5) Cf. with this the viewpoint of Prof. G.C. Oosthuizcn, “Termination of Pregnancy — 
a D.R.C. Viewpoint” in The Great Debate, pp. 60 ff., especially p. 64, as well as the 
viewpoints of Barnard et al., quoted article, pp. 336 ff.
61 Cf. Also G.A. Lindenboom, OpsteUen over Medische Ethick, Kampen, p. 64, who re­
gards abortion as unacceptable to the Christian medic in cases where one might expect 
the unborn child to have serious physical or mental defects. He puts it on a par with 
the killing of crippled or disabled people. Barnard et al (quoted article, p. 344) also re­
ject abortion in the case of a “possibly defective or mentally deficient” foetus.
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pregnancy. The provision as to  incest also creates a problem . Incest may be 
com m itted by two people not related by blood and who have a relationship, 
such as between man and the grown daughter o f his divorced wife. To 
perm it abortion in such a case is highly problem atic.
Against this background the problem may be recapitulated as follows:
(a) A threat to man in the pre-natal state does exist.
(b) The legal order combats this threat by rendering abortion a criminal act 
apart from certain exceptional cases.
(c) There are thus exceptional cases where abortion is sanctioned by law.
(d) The question arises on the one hand as to whether these can be justified 
on Christian principles.
(e) On the other hand the question arises as to whether these exceptions can 
be extended with due reference to  the said principles.
In conclusion the question can be posed as to  whether the Christian has a 
clear solution to  the problem of undesired pregnancy which results in a 
threat to  “man in his pre-natal existence” .
Subsequently, attention will be directed briefly on the one hand at the 
threat inherent in human suffering and on the other hand at the threat 
posed by a highly developed medical science and technology. The com ­
bined effect o f these two threats is the problem of euthanasia.
(i) The threat o f  suffering
That man is exposed to  terrible suffering is no secret. Should this suf­
fering be accom panied by an incurable disease and the position is one of ir­
revocable deterioration, the question arises as to  whether euthanasia would 
not be justified. We all know that this cause has support from tim e to time. 
In this vein a certain Edgar Hill wrote in the Eastern Province Herald on 
February 24, 1979, under the heading “Ticklish Subject for a Saturday 
M orning” :
“What I do suggest, is that any man, provided he is com pos mentis, 
should have the right in certain extrem e circumstances, to request that his 
life be term inated, and if he be non compos mentis, that two doctors, of 
whom one should be preferably his own personal physician, be given the
7) Cf. KJ. van Zyl, quoted article, pp. 218 ff. 
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right to  accord him the mercy of a ‘good death’
In this respect one can also refer to the viewpoint expressed by Prof. 
Chris Barnard recently in the USA Evening Post of July 17, 1978:
“He believes the law will someday change and doctors will be perm itted 
to  stop treatm ent when the treatm ent serves only one purpose — and that is 
to  prolong the suffering of the patien t’.”
In America the situation already exists where a judge may perm it eutha­
nasia. According to the Evening Post of July 17, 1978 a judge in Florida de­
cided “ that an elderly, terminally-ill patient had the right to  die by asking 
for his life-support machine to  be switched off” . In another recent news re­
port from Los Angeles we read:
“While his parents sat by his side, a three-year-old boy died today, just 
17 minutes after a doctor switched off his life-saving respirator. A judge, 
a t the wish of the parents of the boy, identified only as Benjamin C. had a 
short time earlier signed a court order authorising doctors to pull out the 
plug of the machine. Benjamin had been in a coma since he was injured in a 
car accident three months ago. Doctors said he had irreversible, brain- 
dam age” .
What should the response of the Christian legislature be to this threat of 
pain and suffering?
It is well-known that a certain Dr Hartman was found guilty of murder 
in the Supreme Court in 1975. Motivated by pity he had term inated the life 
of his father who was critically ill®). He was sentenced to one year’s im­
prisonm ent suspended for one year on condition that he did not in that year 
com mit an offence involving the intentional infliction of bodily injury. He 
was detained merely until the court adjourned.
This court case highlighted problems surrounding euthanasia. The judge 
referred to this issue by saying that “at this stage the patient presented a 
problem to his medical attendant which brings about a conflict in ethical 
principles, namely to  save life and to relieve pain and suffering. The magni­
tude of this conflict varies naturally with the circumstances of the case” .
From the cou rt’s finding it appears that the infliction of euthanasia is, 
according to  our law, technically and on principle murder but that the pu­
nishm ent is often relatively light as a result of the extenuating circum ­
stances motivating the deed.
8 ) ( ’1. S t a i r  vrrxus  H a r tm a n ,  19 7 r> f i ) , SA ,r)S 2 .
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Judged from  the viewpoint o f Christian ethics it would seem to  me that 
the legal position should be supported. It is hard to  accept tha t Christian 
ethics would sanction the killing o f an incurably ill person ou t o f p ity^).
(it) The threat presented by highly-developed medical science and techno­
logy
Should one approach the m atter from  this angle, the problem s prolife­
rate . Medical science and technology are able nowadays to  keep a person 
alive artificially for a long tim e. In some cases the patien t’s death is post­
poned in a way tha t cannot be sanctioned by Christian m orality, as one can 
describe this process as nothing o ther than cruelty at times. Is this not an in­
fringement o f m an’s inalienable right to  die in peace?
In this respect Dr D.H. Brandt writes the following (in translated form) in 
his article “ Brandpunte betreffende sekere medies-etiese problem e” ^®): 
“A dded to  this one may n o t intensify or prolong the suffering of your 
neighbour. Because one does n o t wish to  have this done to  oneself, one 
should n o t inflict this on another, as one should love one’s neighbour as 
oneself. Can the doctor not aggravate the suffering and grief of his neigh­
bour by over-enthusiastically applying medicines, and also bring grief to  the 
relatives? U ndoubtedly he can do th is” *
9) C.F. Heynj, quoted work, pp. 180-181.
10) Institute for the Advancement of Calvinism, Volume 85 (October 1974), pp. 6-7.
11) Cf. also J  JÍ. van den Berg, Medische macht en medische ethiek, published by G.F. 
Callenbach, N.V. Nijkerk, 1969. Prof. Van den Berg points out that “the doctor shall 
combat death, under all circumstances”. According to him (p. 20), “the constitution 
of medical ethics was sacrosanct, because the doctor had no power” (p. 20). (By 
“power” he means medical-technical knowledge and skill with which to obtain medical 
results undreamed of earlier.) “Nu heeft de arts macht. Moet hij nog? Mag hij nog?” 
(“Now he has power. Should he still? May he still?”). By means of several illustrative 
examples he points out that this “constitution” has led to very undesirable practices in 
our day and age and that under certain conditions the doctor should allow a patient 
to die. Heyns (quoted work, p. 187, n. 62) disputes Van den Berg’s view that the foun­
dation of medical ethics (conservation and prolongation of life) should have signifi­
cance in these days only where prolongation makes sense. To my mind the question to 
be answered is not whether or not the prolongation of the patient’s life makes sense. 
How can one individual decide on the significance or otherwise of another’s life? The 
question should rather centre on whether prolongation may be undertaken in a way 
which will expose the patient cruelly to pain and suffering.
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We have to accept that Christian morality prohibits the cruel prolonga­
tion of suffering. The question now arises as to  whether the principles of 
unauthorised  euthanasia and of authorised non-prolongation of suffering 
can always be distinguished. The answer would seem to be negative. Sup­
pose that — as in the case of Benjamin above — a person has been injured 
in a car accident, incurring such serious brain injury tha t he cannot, medi­
cally speaking, recover, that he suffers grievously and tha t he can be kept 
alive only through intravenous feeding and oxygen. Suppose further that a 
nurse in command of the ward interrupts the oxygen supply so that the pa­
tient dies. Has the patient been murdered or is one dealing in such a case 
with a principle of authorized non-prolongation of suffering? Superficially 
one could say that he has been murdered because (so one could reason) 
the nurse has term inated the patien t’s life through a positive action. Sup­
pose however that the nurse merely refrained from providing for a new oxy­
gen supply after the previous one had been exhausted. In the latter case, one 
might argue, the nurse has done nothing positive to  term inate the p a tien t’s 
life but merely failed to prolong agony. And yet it is clear that in both 
instances the nurse has acted on essentially the same principle: she exercised 
her control over the patient in such a way as to  cause his death deliberate­
ly.
It thus appears that the dividing line between morally forbidden  euthana­
sia and morally permissible non-prolongation of suffering should not be 
sought in the difference between so-called positive and negative euthanasia. 
It is conceivable that even in the case of sanctioned non-prolongation of 
suffering a positive action has to be taken, viz. the cessation of adm inistra­
tion of life -su p p o rt^ ) . There can be no question that the Christian doctor
12) According to Brandt, quoted article, p. 7, “Still more difficult is the decision as to 
whether supporting means or aids which have already been supplied and which may in 
all probability have contributed materially to the prolongation of life, should be 
discontinued. Such discontinuation may constitute positive action. This has to be dis­
tinguished, however, from positive action accompanied by the administering of a speci­
fic substance(s) to induce death quickly. The mere cessation of life-supporting sub­
stances would not deprive the patient of an opportunity to live were his earthly span 
not completed. This observation refers only to those patients who cannot return to 
normal by the administering of these substances... The cessation of therapy which will 
unnecessarily prolong the agony of the patient seems to be justified”. It would seem as 
if Or Brandt is looking for the dividing line between forbidden euthanasia and permis­
sible non-prolongation of agony in the answer to the question as to whether or not
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who is involved in such a situation is in a serious dilemma. On the one hand 
he has to  obey the com m andm ent prohibiting killing while on the other 
hand he has to  obey the com m andm ent to  love his neighbour and not to in­
flict needless cruelty.
Is it fair to  leave it to  the doctor to decide every time which of these 
principles he is dealing with and to expose himself at the same time to  the 
risk of criminal prosecution as a result of our uncertain laws in this respect? 
Should Christians who are in a position to exert an influence on legislation 
not also work towards establishing dear guidelines between permissible and 
forbidden actions? If so: what should the reply of the Christian legislature 
be to  the threat of pain and suffering on the one hand and the threat posed 
by a highly-developed medical science and technology on the other hand?
I leave this question to  you.
It would appear from the foregoing examples that there are threats for 
which the Christian jurist and Christian government have not yet developed 
final counters. Has the time not arrived to start a serious quest for answers? 
Or will the Christian procrastinate until answers are supplied from humanist 
sources?
In conclusion I would like to refer very briefly to  some threats posed by 
the humanist world view as regards the adm inistration of law:
(a) There can be no doubt about the fact that the existentialist world view 
according to which man has an absolute • right of choice has an enormous 
influence on literature. The existentialist writer claims for himself the right 
to write about everything  even should this shock my and your religious sen­
sibilities or offend against our sense of propriety. The legislature has sought 
to  avert this threat by promulgating the Publications Act, 1974.
(b) The Marxist world view threatens or endangers our governmental institu­
tions. The legislature has countered these threats by promulgating the
man’s earthly span has elapsed. Should the answer be affirmative, the administering 
of supportive substances may be terminated — not otherwise. The problem with this 
argument is that it is not always clear when one’s earthly span has ended. Does it not 
perhaps include the time during which one may live only with medical aid? Cf. further: 
C. van’der Meer, Geneesk.und.ige Confrontatie met dc Dood, Staflcu's Wetenschappe- 
lijke Uitgewersmaatschappij, N.V. Leiden, pp. 23-24: “I am of the opinion that it is 
not the duty of the physician to support unendurable agony. When he is convinced 
personally of the inevitability of the patient’s death and the intensity of his agony, 
then it is his duty, preferably in consultation with an uninvolved physician, to cease 
all therapy not aimed at relieving agony”.
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Internal Security Act 1950 and the Terrorism Act 1967.
(c) The existentialist world view has prom oted the abuse of drugs by which 
the physical and mental health of thousands is threatened. The legislature 
tried to counter this threat by promulgating the Abuse of Dependence- 
Producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 1971.
(d) The existentialist world view has become a threat to married life. At the 
mom ent a bill is being considered in Parliament which will put divorce laws 
on a completely different footing. This bill encompasses the principle that a 
court may dissolve a marriage should it seem that there is no reasonable 
chance of reconciliation.
While these laws should be regarded as an effort to  combat evil, the 
Christian should ensure the safety of both himself and his descendants 
against these threats according to the principle expressed in Deuteronomy 
6:6-7: “And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine 
heart: And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk 
of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the 
way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up” .
The concern here is with the Christian principle of education which was 
acknowledged by the legislature in the Act on National Educational Policy 
in 1967, and the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education 
(Private) Act 1950.
May this University continue in its great task of reinforcing Christian 
principles in young people privileged to study here.
* *
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